The Presumption Law Explained
ADAM DOMBCHIK, ESQ.
Managing Partner
Gordon, Edelstein, Krepack, Grant,
Felton & Goldstein, LLP
Labor Code Section 3212.15, effective January 1, 2020, is known as the public safety officer post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) presumption law. The law has been amended on one occasion to extend the ending date of this provision, and it is currently set to terminate as of January 1, 2029. Thus, it is currently applicable to dates of injury, whether specific or cumulative, between January 1, 2020, and January 1, 2029. It applies to active firefighters of a city or county, and peace officers as defined in Section 830.1; subdivisions (a), (b) and (c) of Section 830.2; Section 830.32; subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 830.37; Section 830.5; and Section 830.55 of the Penal Code who are primarily engaged in active law enforcement activities. It applies when the diagnosis of PTSD develops or manifests itself during a period when the public safety officer is in the service of the department, unit, office or agency.
This statute was created to ease the burden of proving industrial causation for PTSD injuries sustained by public safety officers, and allow for immediate access to medical treatment and workers’ compensation benefits. In the legislative intent of the statute, it clearly dictates this public policy: “It is imperative for society to recognize occupational injuries related to post-traumatic stress can be severe, and to encourage peace officers, firefighters, and any other workers suffering from those occupational injuries to promptly seek diagnosis and treatment without stigma. This includes recognizing that severe psychological injury as a result of trauma is not ‘disordered,’ but is a normal and natural human response to trauma, the negative effects of which can be ameliorated through diagnosis and effective treatment.”
Prior to the enactment of this statute (3212.15), and still in effect, is Labor Code Section 3208.3 (amended in 1993), which states that an employee must prove that 51% or greater of the cause of the psychiatric injury, known as “predominant cause,” was work stress in order to receive workers’ compensation benefits.
The issue of proving causation for psychiatric injury was not reconciled by these two statutes, Labor Code Sections 3208.3 and 3212.15, and was not specifically addressed by the Legislature when 3212.15 was enacted, leaving the issue to the courts to determine. The specific question presented: Does a public safety officer still need to prove predominant cause in order to qualify for the PTSD presumption statute?
These two statutes recently collided in a case that I handled. In this case, the public safety officer worked for two separate agencies for a total of 20 years: the first 17 years at a City agency and the last three years at a County agency. When he lateralled to the County, he passed the psychiatric clearance to do the job. Unfortunately, he witnessed an event while working for the County that triggered and caused, for the first time, a diagnosis of PTSD. The officer filed a cumulative trauma claim alleging PTSD injury and asserted that the County should accept his claim per the presumption statute (3212.15). The reporting qualified medical examiner in the case identified five incidents throughout the course of the officer’s 20-year career that contributed to the PTSD when it manifested itself during his County employment, and determined each had equal cause. The first four incidents were at the City and the last was at the County. In light of this history, the County denied the claim and asserted that since it was only responsible for 20% of the cause of the PTSD, the officer had not met the Labor Code Section 3208.3 predominant cause requirement.
The case went to trial. I argued that (1) the law requires that the employer in the last year of a cumulative trauma claim be responsible for the injuries, even if there was injurious exposure beyond that last year of employment by work at another employer (Labor Code Section 5412), and (2) the presumption PTSD statute (3212.15) was created years after Labor Code Section 3208.3 was enacted; it was clear that the Legislature had knowledge of 3208.3 when it enacted this bill, and further, if the Legislature intended to require an applicant to prove predominant cause for the limited diagnosis of PTSD, it would have said so. It did not. Further, it didn’t make any sense that a statute (3212.15) with a stated goal of expediting benefits to a public safety officer suffering from
“[t]rauma-related injuries [which] can become overwhelming and manifest in post-traumatic stress, which may result in substance use disorders and even, tragically, suicide” would then require the extra burden of requiring the predominant cause mandate of Labor Code Section 3208.3. The trial judge ruled in my client’s favor, and the County appealed the decision.
On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board resoundingly rejected the defendant’s position and agreed with my arguments, concluding, “However, defendant insists that the Legislature implicitly imported section 3208.3(b)(1)’s predominant causation requirement into section 3212.15. According to defendant, the Legislature did this by enacting the latter statute without expressly excluding the predominant causation requirement of the former statute. We disagree…. [T]he sort of presumption afforded by section 3212.15 is a reflection of public policy whose purpose is to provide additional compensation to employees who provide vital and hazardous services by easing their burden of proof of industrial causation. In this case, defendant’s proposed interpretation of section 3212.15 — that it inherited the long-standing predominant causation requirement of section 3208.3(b)(1) — would have the opposite effect that evidently was intended by the Legislature. That is, defendant’s interpretation of section 3212.15 would likely reduce compensation to employees (like this applicant) who provide vital and hazardous services, by further burdening their burden of proof. Defendant’s proposed interpretation also is inconsistent with well-settled rules of statutory construction, e.g., statutes should be interpreted so as to promote rather than defeat the purpose of the statute, and interpretations that lead to absurd consequences should be avoided.”
The court’s decision resolves the conflict between these two statutes, and affirms the important public policy of allowing easier access to workers’ compensation benefits for a PTSD injury sustained by a public safety officer.
About the Author
Adam Dombchik is recognized as a certified specialist in workers’ compensation law by the State Bar of California and is a past president of the California Applicants Attorneys Association.